華師經(jīng)管學術講座第469期（經(jīng)濟）
【題目】 A Deduction Mechanism for Public Goods Provision: Theory and Experiment
【主講人】香港嶺南大學洪福海副教授
【主持人】新葡的京集團350vip8888連洪泉副教授
【時間】 12月28日（周四）16:30
【地點】經(jīng)濟與管理學院文2棟301會議室
【摘要】
We propose a simple commitment mechanism prior to a public goods contribution game. Each player simultaneously and independently proposes a deduction rate, which serves as a proposal for the rate by which the return on private investment accounts will be reduced. The group deduction rate is determined by the minimum level of the individually proposed rates. In the two-stage game with linear payoffs, the first-best outcome is achieved in the refined equilibrium, with a sufficiently high group deduction rate being chosen. The mechanism also improves efficiency for non-linear games. We conduct a laboratory experiment to empirically investigate whether and how our counter-intuitive mechanism works. The experimental findings highlight the importance of learning opportunities via examples. Even with repeated play, many subjects persist in choosing low deduction rates and therefore, welfare remains low. However, with exogenously given examples of group deduction rates, subjects learn quickly and achieve efficient outcomes when they later determine the deduction rates endogenously.
[主講人簡介]
洪福海，香港科技大學經(jīng)濟學博士，現(xiàn)為香港嶺南大學經(jīng)濟系副教授，曾任教于上海財經(jīng)大學和新加坡南洋理工大學。主要研究方向為行為與實驗經(jīng)濟學、應用微觀經(jīng)濟理論。論文發(fā)表在Games and Economic Behavior, Experimental Economics, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Journal of Public Economics, Management Science等國際著名期刊。