華師經(jīng)英seminar第42期
【題目】Information Design, Externalities, and Government Interventions（信息設(shè)計(jì)，外部性和政府干預(yù)）
【主講人】肖彥成博士
【主持人】周勻月博士
【時(shí)間】7月7日（周四）下午2:00
【地點(diǎn)】文二棟301會議室
【主講人簡介】肖彥成，美國田納西大學(xué)諾克斯維爾校區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博士，新葡的京集團(tuán)350vip8888經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院講師。研究領(lǐng)域包括微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)理論、網(wǎng)絡(luò)理論和健康經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)，研究興趣是把網(wǎng)絡(luò)理論應(yīng)用到疫苗接種、人口流動等的現(xiàn)實(shí)問題中去。論文見于European Economic Review等期刊。
【摘要】We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion with spillovers. A sender produces information to persuade a receiver to take an action with external effects. We consider how government interventions, including corrective taxes and subsidies, affect social welfare. In addition to internalizing externalities, government interventions affect social welfare through an informational channel. Subsidies to the sender's preferred action incentivize the sender to produce less information, but taxes on the sender's preferred action incentivize the sender to produce more information. Because of such an informational effect, the optimal corrective subsidies and taxes may be different from the Pigouvian level. In some cases, social welfare is maximized with no government intervention.