華師經英seminar第40期
【題目】Crowding in School Choice
【主講人】周愚副教授(日本京都大學，經濟學研究科)
【主持人】周勻月博士
【時間】6月23日（周四）下午1:00
【地點】 騰訊會議794-844-594（會議密碼內部通知，參會人員請輸入“實名+單位”進入會場，會場謝絕一切廣告信息！）
【主講人簡介】周愚，副教授（青年）日本京都大學經濟學研究科，主要研究方向為微觀經濟學，博弈論以及市場設計。美國數學學會《數學評論》評論員，主要論文發表在在Games and Economic Behaviors，Inter national Economic Review以及經濟研究等雜志上。目前完成并主持日本國家級課題3項（青年項目），作為子課題負責人承擔日本國家級重大課題3項。
【摘要】We consider the market design problem of matching students to schools in the presence of crowding effects. These effects are salient in parents' decision making and the empirical literature; however, they cause major difficulties in the design of satisfactory mechanisms and, as such, are not currently considered. We propose a new framework and an equilibrium notion that accommodates crowding, no-envy, and respect for priorities. The equilibrium has a student-optimal element that induces an incentive compatible mechanism and is implementable via a novel algorithm. Moreover, analogs of fundamental structural results of the matching literature---the Rural Hospitals Theorem, welfare lattice, etc.---survive.