華師經(jīng)管學(xué)術(shù)講座第376期（管理）
主題：Brand Spillover as a Marketing Strategy
時(shí)間：2021年9月23日（周四）上午10:00-11:30
騰訊會(huì)議 ID：868 115 178
會(huì)議密碼：6688
主講人：吳肖樂教授（復(fù)旦大學(xué)）
主持人：卿前愷副教授
主講人簡介：
吳肖樂，復(fù)旦大學(xué)管理學(xué)院教授、博士生導(dǎo)師。2006年本科畢業(yè)于清華大學(xué)工業(yè)工程系，2011年博士畢業(yè)于圣路易斯華盛頓大學(xué)。主要研究供應(yīng)鏈管理、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理等。其研究工作發(fā)表于Management Science, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Production and Operations Management等管理類期刊。曾獲中國管理學(xué)青年獎(jiǎng)(2017)、華人學(xué)者管理科學(xué)與工程協(xié)會(huì)最佳論文一等獎(jiǎng)(2011)、2016 MSOM Meritorious Service Award等。2020年獲國家自然科學(xué)基金杰出青年科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目資助，2016年獲國家自然科學(xué)基金優(yōu)秀青年科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目資助。入選上海市教育系統(tǒng)三八紅旗手（2021）、上海市教育系統(tǒng)巾幗建功標(biāo)兵（2020）、上海市曙光人才計(jì)劃（2016）。目前擔(dān)任UTD期刊POM的Senior Editor、INFORMS期刊Service Science 和Modern Supply Chain Research and Applications 的Associate Editor。并擔(dān)任中國管理現(xiàn)代化研究會(huì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理專業(yè)委員會(huì)秘書長、中國管理現(xiàn)代化研究會(huì)運(yùn)作管理專業(yè)委員會(huì)委員、中國管理現(xiàn)代化研究會(huì)管理與決策科學(xué)專業(yè)委員會(huì)常務(wù)理事、中國運(yùn)籌學(xué)會(huì)隨機(jī)服務(wù)與運(yùn)作管理分會(huì)常務(wù)理事等。
摘要：
When a weak-brand firm and a strong-brand firm source from a common contract manufacturer, the weak-brand firm may advertise this relationship to promote its own product. This paper investigates whether the weak-brand firm should use such brand spillover as a marketing strategy and how this decision depends on the firms' characteristics and market conditions. We develop a game theoretic model consisting of one contract manufacturer and two firms with asymmetric brand power. The contract manufacturer determines the wholesale prices for the two firms and then each firm decides whether to source from the contract manufacturer. If both firms outsource to the contract manufacturer, then the weak-brand firm may choose whether to promote its product through brand spillover. Although brand spillover improves the attractiveness of the weak-brand firm's product at no cost, we find that the weak-brand firm should not use brand spillover if (1) its original brand power is sufficiently low or (2) the contract manufacturer does not have a significant cost advantage. Interestingly, the adoption of brand spillover by the weak-brand firm can benefit all three parties under certain circumstances, including the strong-brand firm. Nevertheless, when the contract manufacturer has a significant cost advantage, in equilibrium the strong-brand firm will be hurt by brand spillover and hence should take actions to prevent it.