華南經(jīng)濟論壇第281期
題目：Costly Signaling in E-Commerce Markets: Empirical Evidence from A Quasi-Experiment on Taobao.com
時間：6月4日下午2:00
地點：騰訊會議（會議號：853 355 951；密碼：3931）
匯報人：邱杰宏博士
匯報人簡介：
邱杰宏，美國華盛頓州立大學(xué)經(jīng)濟學(xué)博士，研究方向為：應(yīng)用計量經(jīng)濟學(xué)與大數(shù)據(jù)，實證產(chǎn)業(yè)組織。貝業(yè)思數(shù)據(jù)智能技術(shù)服務(wù)有限公司聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人，目前擔(dān)任數(shù)據(jù)科學(xué)家職務(wù)。
摘要：Reputation systems in e-commerce markets are widely adopted to mitigate information asymmetries, but instead they undermine market competition because new sellers are unlikely to sell their products. In this paper we study how signaling mechanisms can be employed by e-commerce markets to fix the drawback of reputation systems. Guided by a dynamic signaling theory, we compile data from the largest e-commerce market in China to examine the treatment effects of signaling programs on transactions under three scenarios: different signaling costs, different product values and different reputation ratings. The theoretical and empirical findings of the paper indicate the following requirements for an efficient signaling mechanism which can facilitate transactions of new sellers in an e-commerce market: 1. the reputation system of the market can generate reliable customer reviews; 2. the product value is high; 3. the signaling cost is high, especially for low-reputation sellers; and 4. the signaling cost and the status of taking signaling actions are factored in ranking the display order of sellers.
歡迎感興趣的師生參加！