“華師經英Seminar”第一期
題目：3PL Financing in A Capital-constrained Supply Chain
主講人：華勝亞（新葡的京集團350vip8888經濟與管理學院青年英才）
時間：2019年10月10日(周四)下午3：30
地點：學院301會議室
華勝亞，新葡的京集團350vip8888經濟與管理學院青年英才，北京大學光華管理學院博士畢業。研究興趣包括供應鏈管理，服務運營。曾在(包括接收)International Journal of Production Economic, 管理科學學報，中國管理科學等期刊發表論文，多次在INFORMS年會，POMS年會，POMS-HK分會進行學術匯報。
摘要：Motivated by the practice that some 3PLs, such as UPS and Eternal Asia, finance retailers' inventories with low interest rate, this paper investigates the design of wholesale price contract and 3PL financing contract in a three-tire supply chain consisting of a supplier, a 3PL, and a newsvendor-like retailer. The retailer, with limit working capital, purchases from the supplier and the finished products are delivered by the 3PL. The retailer can apply for bank financing or 3PL financing when necessary. We model channel members' interaction as a Stackelberg game where the supplier is the leader. Our results show that the 3PL should always finance the retailer with low interest rate to induce the retailer to order more and then the 3PL obtains more profit from the logistics service. The supplier also benefits from 3PL financing by receiving a larger order from the retailer. Compared with bank financing, the retailer is better off under 3PL financing with a lower purchasing cost (ordering cost plus transportation cost) and financing cost if it is not very poor. In our extensions, we conclude that all members' optimal decisions do no change when the 3PL is also capital constrained but can borrow from a bank. When the Stackelberg game leader is the 3PL instead of the supplier, we briefly discuss the retailer's and supplier's problems. Through a numerical experiment, we show that the retailer and 3PL are better off but the supplier is worse off under 3PL leadership.
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