“華師經(jīng)英Seminar”第一期
題目：3PL Financing in A Capital-constrained Supply Chain
主講人：華勝亞（新葡的京集團(tuán)350vip8888經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院青年英才）
時(shí)間：2019年10月10日(周四)下午3：30
地點(diǎn)：學(xué)院301會(huì)議室
華勝亞，新葡的京集團(tuán)350vip8888經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院青年英才，北京大學(xué)光華管理學(xué)院博士畢業(yè)。研究興趣包括供應(yīng)鏈管理，服務(wù)運(yùn)營(yíng)。曾在(包括接收)International Journal of Production Economic, 管理科學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)，中國(guó)管理科學(xué)等期刊發(fā)表論文，多次在INFORMS年會(huì)，POMS年會(huì)，POMS-HK分會(huì)進(jìn)行學(xué)術(shù)匯報(bào)。
摘要：Motivated by the practice that some 3PLs, such as UPS and Eternal Asia, finance retailers' inventories with low interest rate, this paper investigates the design of wholesale price contract and 3PL financing contract in a three-tire supply chain consisting of a supplier, a 3PL, and a newsvendor-like retailer. The retailer, with limit working capital, purchases from the supplier and the finished products are delivered by the 3PL. The retailer can apply for bank financing or 3PL financing when necessary. We model channel members' interaction as a Stackelberg game where the supplier is the leader. Our results show that the 3PL should always finance the retailer with low interest rate to induce the retailer to order more and then the 3PL obtains more profit from the logistics service. The supplier also benefits from 3PL financing by receiving a larger order from the retailer. Compared with bank financing, the retailer is better off under 3PL financing with a lower purchasing cost (ordering cost plus transportation cost) and financing cost if it is not very poor. In our extensions, we conclude that all members' optimal decisions do no change when the 3PL is also capital constrained but can borrow from a bank. When the Stackelberg game leader is the 3PL instead of the supplier, we briefly discuss the retailer's and supplier's problems. Through a numerical experiment, we show that the retailer and 3PL are better off but the supplier is worse off under 3PL leadership.
歡迎師生參加！