華南經濟論壇第267期：劉爍助理教授講座
題目：Delegating Performance Evaluation
主講人：劉爍 北京大學助理教授
時間：2019年9月26日（周四）下午2:30
地點：文科樓三棟MBA中心415課室
作者簡介：劉爍，2019年畢業于瑞士蘇黎世大學經濟系，獲博士學位，現為北京大學光華管理學院應用經濟系助理教授。目前主要研究領域為組織經濟學，產業組織理論，機制設計和博弈論。研究成果發表或即將發表于國際知名學術期刊，如RAND Journal of Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, Economic Theory. 曾獲獎項包括瑞士國家科學基金會博士訪學獎助金 (SNSF Doc. Mobility Fellowship, 用于資助到美國哥倫比亞大學經濟系訪問一年)，法國外交和歐洲事務部埃菲爾獎學金 (Eiffel Scholarship)
摘要：We study optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents when performance evaluation is delegated to a reviewer. The reviewer may be biased in favor of the agents, but the degree of bias is unknown to the principal. We show that a contest, which is a contract in which the principal determines a set of prizes to be allocated to the agents, is optimal. By using a contest, the principal can commit to sustaining incentives despite the reviewer’s potential leniency bias. The optimal effort profile can be uniquely implemented by an all-pay auction with a cap. Our analysis has implications for applications as diverse as the design of worker compensation, the awarding of research grants, and the allocation of foreign aid.