劉瀟博士學術講座通知
題目：Competing Openly or Blindly in Crowdsourcing Contests?
主講人：劉瀟 博士
時間：11月7日(周五)下午15：00
地點：學院301會議室
歡迎感興趣的師生積極參與！
劉瀟老師的簡介：清華大學助理教授，密歇根大學博士。研究方向為實驗經濟學、行為經濟學和博弈論。曾在Management Science,Games and Economic Behavior等管理學和經濟學頂級期刊發表論文多篇。
摘要: Organizations are increasingly outsourcing tasks once performed in-house to wider participants on the Internet by hosting online contests. In practice, two types of mechanisms are used to organize these contests: simultaneous (blind) and sequential (open). In a simultaneous contest, contestants submit their solutions independently without access to one another's submissions, while in a sequential contest, contestants submit their solutions sequentially and each can view all prior submissions before making their decisions. Most prior theoretical and experimental research has focused on simultaneous contests, with only a handful that have studied sequential ones. In this paper, under the condition of incomplete information, we analytically show that simultaneous contests produce higher quality best solutions than sequential contests. Using a laboratory experiment, we test this theoretical prediction as well as the prediction that simultaneous contests are more efficient than sequential contests. Our data support both predictions. We also discover that as the number of contestants increases, the efficiency of sequential contests drops significantly, further reducing their performance relative to simultaneous contests.