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杜寧華副教授學(xué)術(shù)講座通知

2014-10-22 11:29:00 來源:院科研辦 點(diǎn)擊: 收藏本文

題目:Common Value Auctions with Return Policies: An Experiment 

主講人:杜寧華  副教授

時(shí)間:10月22日(周三)下午15:00

地點(diǎn):學(xué)院301會(huì)議室
歡迎感興趣的師生積極參與!
 

內(nèi)容摘要:

In common-value second-price auctions of items with uncertain value, we examine the role of fixed-fee return policies that resemble many situations in real business practice: e.g., deposits in oil field auctions, mineral and gas right auctions, spectrum auctions, and money-back guarantees with fixed shipping and handling charges in eBay auctions. Theory makes the prediction that a more generous return policy will hurt the winning bidder by eroding consumer surplus through higher bids. Theory also demonstrates that the seller’s revenue increases as the handling fee for returning the auctioned item decreases, but remains positive. For free returns, there are multiple equilibria, all involving zero consumer surplus for the winning bidder, but with different implications for sellers. In our experimental setting, items may have a high value of 100 or a low value of 0 with an a priori 50% probability of each outcome. There are experimental four treatments: No Return (NR), High Fee (HF), Low Fee (LF) and Free Return (FR). We observe that bids increase and bidders’ earnings decrease when the handling fee decreases as predicted. However, we also observe that in the FR treatment many bidders bid above the highest possible value and subsequently return the item regardless of the revealed value. While this is consistent with equilibrium behavior, it is an equilibrium that is not optimal for the seller.

 

 

杜寧華老師的簡(jiǎn)介:現(xiàn)任上海財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院副教授、經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)實(shí)驗(yàn)室主任,博士生導(dǎo)師。2005年獲得美國亞利桑那大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博士學(xué)位,主攻實(shí)驗(yàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)。亞利桑那大學(xué)的經(jīng)濟(jì)科學(xué)實(shí)驗(yàn)室是北美最早成立的實(shí)驗(yàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究基地,由2002年諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)得主Vernon Smith創(chuàng)建。由于杜寧華的加盟,上海財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)增設(shè)了實(shí)驗(yàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)方向的博士點(diǎn)。杜寧華博士近年來致力于運(yùn)用實(shí)驗(yàn)手段回答各種與市場(chǎng)機(jī)制相關(guān)的問題,其研究成果見于Games and Economic Behavior, European Economic Review, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,Decision Support Systems等著名國際學(xué)術(shù)期刊,以及《管理科學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)》等國內(nèi)權(quán)威期刊。