華師經(jīng)管學(xué)術(shù)講座第473期（經(jīng)濟(jì)）
【主題】Correlation Neglect in College Admission: An Experimental Evidence
【主講人】宋彥 副研究員（山東大學(xué)）
【主持人】劉愿 教授
【時(shí)間】2024年5月16日（周四）14:00
【地點(diǎn)】536會(huì)議室
【摘要】This study investigates correlation neglect in matching markets and evaluate whether policies targeting failure of contingent thinking and providing objective admission probabilities can effectively improve students’ outcomes. Using controlled experiments mirroring real-world college admission scenarios, we find that a significant portion of students adopt overly aggressive strategies, neglecting correlation. Reminding students about the correlation of admission probabilities and switching to Iterative Deferred Acceptance does not lower the ratio of students with aggressive strategies. In contrast, providing the admission probabilities to students more than doubled the percentage of subjects choosing the optimal strategy. This study contributes to understanding correlation neglect in matching markets and offers insights into potential interventions to improve decision-making in school choice mechanisms.
【主講人簡(jiǎn)介】宋彥，山東大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院，副研究員，2016年畢業(yè)于加拿大McGill University，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博士。主要研究領(lǐng)域?yàn)閯趧?dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)，成果見諸于Journal of Economic and Behavior Organization, Economics of Education Review, Health Economics等期刊。
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